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2Distributing Excess Cash: The Role of Specially Designated Dividends
Abstract
This study explores why firms distribute excess cash as specially designated dividends
(SDDs) instead of using regular dividends or repurchasing shares.  We survey top managers of
NASDAQ, AMEX, and NYSE firms issuing at least one SDD between 1994 and 2001.  The results
show that firms tend to pay SDDs when they experience strong earnings and cash flows and want to
increase at least temporarily the yield to shareholders.  Having strong earnings and cash flows also
provide an impetus for regular dividend increases, but paying regular dividends is part of a firm’s
standard dividend policy.  The primary motives for repurchasing shares are to take advantage of
perceived market undervaluation of the firm’s shares and to improve performance measures,
especially.  Overall, the results lend support to the signaling explanation for the disbursement of
excess funds, but not the free cash flow or wealth transfer explanations.  
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1.  Introduction
On July 20, 2004, Microsoft Corp., which had amassed nearly $60 billion in cash, announced
that it would return about $32 billion in a one-time dividend of $3 for every share held by investors.1
The software giant had been under mounting pressure from Wall Street to put its growing pool of cash
to better use than simply earning interest.  In explaining the plan, John G. Connors, Microsoft’s chief
financial officer, said the company was trying to navigate through the demands of several types of
investor groups.  Some investors wanted higher regular dividends; others wanted a large cash payout;
while still others wanted a more aggressive stock buyback program.  Although this event is unique
because of its size and most technology companies offer no dividends, the practice of paying large
specials increased in recent years.2
A dividend may be “special” for various reasons, but the intention is often to differentiate this
special payment from the normal dividend stream and avoid disrupting the pattern of normal dividends
declared by a company.  A common view is that special dividends are distributions to investors of
large, non-recurring cash inflows, as opposed to regular cash dividends, which firms tend to fund with
recurring earnings.  Thus, specials allow managers to make temporary increases in cash payouts
without necessarily committing to continue the higher distribution in future years.  In this study, we
define a specially designated dividend (SDD) as a cash dividend labeled by management as “extra,”
“special,” or “year-end.”  In theory, management should use labeling to differentiate SDDs from
regular (unlabeled) dividends.  
Managers face three major ways of distributing excess cash to shareholders: initiate or
increase regular dividends, repurchase shares, and pay SDDs.3  Corporate managers and directors
                                                
1 See Krim (2004) for a discussion of Microsoft’s announcement to pay a special dividend to investors.
2 In a study of NYSE firms for 1926-1995, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) find that despite a dramatic
overall decline in specials, the incidence of very large specials increased in recent years.
3 Lie (2000) shows that firms using all three methods tend to have funds in excess of industry norms before the
events.
4presumably select the distribution method that increases the value of the firm.  Although some firms
use all of these distribution methods, they often do so at different times.  According to Crutchley,
Hudson, Jensen, and Marshall (2003), the method selected is likely to depend on the firm’s expected
future earnings and cash flows as well as prior share price performance.  Jagannathan, Stephens,
and Weisback (2000) note that the flexibility inherent in repurchase programs is another reason firms
use repurchases instead of using regular dividends.  That is, stock repurchases offer firms another
means of distributing their “lumpy,” non-recurring cash flows.  Similar logic could also apply to paying
large, infrequent SDDs.4  Thus, under certain circumstances firms may substitute repurchases or
SDDs for regular dividends when they have excess cash flows.
If managers anticipate above average earnings and cash flows that appear sustainable, they
are more likely to initiate or increase regular dividends rather than repurchase shares or pay SDDs.
Brickley (1983) finds that firms tend to declare both regular dividend increases and SDDs after
experiencing good earnings over the previous year.  The firms declaring regular dividend increases
have significantly larger earnings changes in the year after the dividend increase than do the firms
declaring SDDs.  The dividend performance following a regular dividend increase also dominates that
following an SDD.  Jagannathan et al. (2000) report that firms pay regular dividends with higher
“permanent” operating cash flows, but use higher “temporary,” non-operating cash flows for
repurchases.  They also find that repurchasing firms have more volatile earnings than dividend-paying
firms do.  Gombola and Liu (1999) conclude that SDD announcements convey favorable information
about transitory, not permanent, earnings.  Lie (2000) finds that excess funds are largely nonrecurring
for SDD and self-tender offer firms and recurring for regular dividend increase firms.  Similarly,
Crutchley et al. (2003) find that firms announce SDDs after temporary increases in operating
                                                
4 Regular dividend increases and SDDs are both dividend decisions representing cash disbursements to
shareholders with identical tax consequences.  Firms may use share repurchases in lieu of cash dividends to
minimize stockholder taxes.  This tax-motivated substitution of share repurchases for dividends results from the
favorable tax treatment given to share repurchases over cash dividends under U.S. tax law.  That is, investors
who choose to sell to the firm incur capital gains taxes.  Non-selling shareholders pay no immediate tax bill, but
receive a pro-rata increase in their ownership in the firm.  Evidence by Chhachhi and Davisdon (1997) as well
as Grullon, and Michaely (2002) lends support to the tax-motivated substitution for dividends explanation.
5performance, but these unexpected earnings decline significantly in the years following the special
dividend.  
If firms experience poor stock price performance, they are more likely to repurchase shares
than to initiate or increase regular dividends or pay a SDD.  Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen
(1995) report evidence consistent with the possibility of market undervaluation at the time firms
announce a repurchase.  Stephens and Weisback (1998) find a negative relationship between share
repurchase and prior stock price performance, suggesting that firms increase stock repurchases
depending on the perceived degree of stock undervaluation.  Thus, firms may be reluctant to
repurchase shares after a period of increased stock prices.  They also find a positive relationship
between repurchases and the levels of cash flow, suggesting that firms actively adjust their buyback
behavior to their cash position.  Jagannathan et al. (2000) find evidence that firms repurchase stock
following poor stock market performance and increase dividends following good performance.  In
contrast, Crutchley et al. (2003) document that those firms paying SDDs earn significant positive
excess returns the year before the SDD announcement.  Thus, an implication of the decision to
distribute excess cash to shareholders using a SDD rather than a stock repurchase is that managers
believe the current share price is not undervalued.
In this study, we follow a different path to understanding why companies pay SDDs instead of
using alternative methods of distributing excess cash.  Unlike previous research on SDDs, we survey
senior executives of U.S. incorporated firms that paid special dividends to obtain direct evidence
about their views.  Other studies generally provide only indirect evidence about the motivations behind
using one distribution method versus another, whereas we provide direct evidence from managers.
The study is important for at least two reasons.  First, the paper adds to the body of research
by being the first to examine SDDs using survey research methodology.  Our study follows a long
practice in finance of surveying managers about dividend policy.5  As with other approaches used to
                                                
5 For surveys on regular dividends, see Baker, Farrelly, and Edelman (1985), Baker and Powell (1999), Baker
and Powell (2000), and Baker, Veit, and Powell (2001); and for surveys on stock repurchase programs, see
Baker, Gallagher, and Morgan (1980), Wansley, Lane, and Sarkar (1989), Tsetsekos, Kaufman, and Gitman
(1991), and Baker, Powell, and Veit (2003).
6investigate managerial behavior, survey research has its strengths and weaknesses.  Although
surveys of managers do not replace other empirical approaches, they complement them and yield
additional insights.  As Bruner (2002, p. 50) notes, “The task must be to look for patterns of
confirmation across approaches and studies much like one sees an image in a mosaic of stones.”
Second, the study enhances our understanding of corporate payout policy in the United
States.  Specifically, we offer additional insights into the role of SDDs as a means of distributing
excess cash compared with regular dividends and share repurchases.  In most instances, our results
reinforce and complement previous research, while a few others are surprising.  As one of the few
studies, except Lie (2000), investigating the three methods of distributing excess funds, it sheds
additional light on how managers view these methods.  
In this study, we have three main objectives: (1) to identify why firms choose to pay SDDs; (2)
to discover why firms choose to use regular (unlabeled) dividends or repurchase shares as a means
of distributing temporary excess cash instead of paying SDDs; and (3) to learn how managers view
various statements about SDDs derived from prior empirical research.  Although our study is partially
exploratory in nature, we have a priori expectations about some responses from the survey
participants.
We address three major research questions in this study.  First, why do firms choose to pay
SDDs?  While there are many possible reasons, we expect that the major motive for paying SDDs is
to distribute cash resulting from a temporary increase in earnings or cash flows.  That is, managers
view any increase in earnings or cash flows as short-lived, not permanent.  Crutchley et al. (2003)
show that unlike regular dividend increases and share repurchases, SDD announcements indicate
current excess performance rather than expected improvements in long-run performance.  Thus, firms
generally announce SDDs after periods of temporary increases in operating performance and positive
stock performance.  Our findings support this expectation by showing that having strong earnings or
cash flows is the most important impetus for paying a SDD.
Second, why do firms choose to use regular (unlabeled) dividends or repurchase shares as a
means of distributing temporary excess cash instead of paying a SDD?  The literature contains
7various explanations for paying dividends such as signaling, tax-preference, and agency costs, but
previous research does not attempt to differentiate between the motives for paying regular dividends
versus SDDs with temporary excess cash.  Conventional wisdom suggests that management
increases the regular dividend only when it is confident that the firm can maintain the new dividend
over time, but distributes temporary cash in the form of a SDD or share repurchase.  Thus, we make
no predictions about the motives for initiating or increasing regular dividends with temporary excess
cash.  Our results show that two responses tied as the top-ranked motive -- having strong earnings or
cash flows and serving as part of standard dividend policy.  A third reason for paying regular
dividends with temporary excess cash is to exert a positive influence on stock price, which appears to
be a signaling motive.
We expect firms to distribute temporary excess cash to shareholders through share
repurchases instead of paying a SDD when managers believe the current share price is undervalued.
This finding would be consistent with Crutchley et al. (2003) and survey data by Baker, Powell, and
Veit (2003b).  We also anticipate that managers buy back shares with excess cash instead of paying
a SDD because share repurchase results in higher accounting measures such as earnings per share
(EPS) than do SDDs.  Baker et al. (2003b) report that the third most common reason for open market
repurchases is to increase EPS.  The findings from the current survey support our expectations.
Third, how do managers view various statements about SDDs derived from empirical
research?  In general, we expect the responses to be consistent with previous research findings.
Overall, the mean responses to statements in this study are generally consistent with the findings
found in the dividend literature.  For example, respondents express a high level of agreement with the
statement that firms tend to repurchase shares instead of using SDDs when managers believe their
firm’s current stock is under priced.  Respondents also agree that the stock market generally views an
announcement of an unexpected SDD as conveying positive information about a firm’s short-term
earnings.  Our findings do not necessarily suggest that respondents are familiar with the research
studies upon which the statements are based.
8Our results have several implications for investors.  Perhaps the most important implication is
that paying SDDs generally reflects only a temporary increase in excess cash.  Although some firms
pay SDDs frequently, this practice is not the norm.  Thus, announcements of SDDs signal only
temporary increases in cash flows levels, not permanent increases.  Having strong earnings and cash
flows also provide an impetus for regular dividend increases, but paying regular dividends is part of a
firm’s standard dividend policy.  The primary motives for repurchasing shares are to take advantage of
perceived market undervaluation of the firm’s shares and to improve performance measures,
especially.  Thus, investors can often expect a stock repurchase to signal management’s perception
that the market is currently underpricing the firm’s shares.
The remainder of this paper has the following organization.  Section 2 discusses the literature
relating to methods of distributing excess cash, especially SDDs.  Section 3 presents the research
design including a discussion of the survey instrument, sample, and limitations of the study.  Section 3
presents the results.  Section 4 provides a summary and our conclusions.
2. Literature Review
In this section, we discuss relevant literature about methods of distributing excess cash.
Previous research generally documents a significant, positive stock price reaction to the
announcement of increases in regular dividends, share repurchases, and SDDs and investigates the
rationale for such behavior.6, 7  The magnitude of the price reaction tends to differ depending on the
type and size of distribution.  For example, Brickley (1983) finds that regular dividend increases result
in more positive market reaction than do SDDs of similar relative size.  Chhachhi and Davisdon (1997)
report a larger market reaction for tender-offer stock repurchases than SDDs even after controlling for
                                                
6 For a compressive review of dividend signaling, see Allen and Michaely (1995).
7 Denis (1990) reports evidence indicating that announcements of defensive repurchases are associated with an
average negative impact on the share price of the target firm.  In contrast, special dividend payments generally
increase the wealth of target firm shareholders.
9their larger relative size and preferential capital gains tax rate.  Because the literature in this area is
voluminous, we focus our discussion on SDDs.8
Several explanations exist for the positive announcement effects surrounding SDDs, but three
major contenders involve information signaling, free cash flow, and wealth transfers.  Of these
theories, the signaling hypothesis is the leading explanation for abnormal returns on the
announcement of SDDs because it has the most empirical support.  The evidence favoring the free
cash flow and wealth transfer hypotheses is scant.  We begin our discussion by reviewing each
explanation and then discuss the historical trend in paying SDDs.
According to the signaling hypothesis, cash disbursements, such as through SDDs, signal
favorable information about the firm’s future earnings and cash flows.  Studies by Brickley (1983),
Jayaraman and Shastri (1988), Howe, He and Kao (1992), Shih (1992), Mitra (1997), Chhachhi and
Davidson (1997), Gombola and Liu (1999), and Crutchley et al. (2003) support this hypothesis by
showing that the announcements of SDDs result in an upward revaluation of stock prices.  DeAngelo
et al. (2000) find that while recent years’ special dividends generally convey good news to investors,
any such signaling content is typically small.
For example, Brickley (1983) examines common stock returns surrounding infrequent and
hence unanticipated SDDs and compares them to those surrounding regular dividend increases.  The
results support the notion that management uses the labeling of dividend increases to convey
information to the market about a firm’s future prospects, but regular dividend increases convey more
positive information than do SDDs.  Thus, Brickley’s evidence indicates that investors treat SDDs as
hedged managerial signals about future profitability in that SDDs have weaker stock market reactions
than do regular dividend increases of comparable size.  This evidence supports the information-
signaling hypothesis.  
The free cash flow (excess funds) hypothesis, developed by Jensen (1986) and extended by
Lang and Litzenberger (1989), asserts that disbursements may mitigate agency problems between
                                                
8 For a review of the literature on regular dividends and stock repurchases, see Lease et al. (2000), Bierman
(2001), Frankfurter, Wood, and Wansley (2003), and Copeland, Weston, and Shastri (2005).
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managers and shareholders.  Specifically, a cash disbursement reduces funds available to mangers
and prevents them from investing in negative net present value (NPV) projects.  Thus, firms with
greater agency problems of free cash flows should have a greater price reaction to a dividend
increase.  Such firms should be those with poor investment opportunities and lower Tobin’s q ratios.
Howe et al. (1992) test whether the market interprets SDDs as a means to distribute free cash
flow to shareholders.  The results show that the market’s reaction to SDDs is about the same for both
high-q and low-q firms.  Thus, their evidence does not support the free cash flow hypothesis.  Instead,
the information-signaling motive appears to be the driving force underlying these returns.  Similarly,
the results in the Gombola and Liu (1999) study do not support the free cash flow hypothesis but
strongly support the signaling hypothesis.  Lie (2000) interprets his findings to suggest that large
incremental disbursements in the form of large special dividends effectively curb overinvestment,
while the evidence for small incremental disbursements is inconclusive.
The third explanation of the price reaction involves a wealth transfer effect from bondholders to
stockholders as the dividend payment undermines the assets protecting the bondholders.  Jayaraman
and Shastri (1988) test the wealth transfer hypothesis by analyzing the behavior of stock and bond
prices on dates surrounding their announcements.  They find that the positive price reaction for stocks
is significant and substantially larger than the small and insignificant negative price reaction for bonds.
These results do not support the wealth transfer hypothesis but are consistent with the information-
signaling hypothesis.  Similarly, the results contained in Gombola and Liu (1999) do not support the
notion of wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders but provide direct evidence supporting the
signaling hypothesis.  
DeAngelo et al. (2000) examine the evolution of SDDs paid by NYSE firms over 1926-1994.
Their evidence shows that NYSE firms once commonly paid SDDs but now they rarely distribute cash
in this manner.  In the past, firms generally paid specials almost as predictably as they paid regular
dividends.  Despite the overall decline in specials, firms actually increased the use of very large
specials in recent years.  Finally, firms did not replace SDDs with stock repurchases.  They attribute
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the decline of small SDDs to their predictability, which made them close substitutes for regular
dividends.
III. Research Design
The three subsections that follow describe the survey instrument used to collect data,
information about the sample, and limitations of the study. 
A.  Survey Instrument
We developed our original set of questions based on an extensive review of the relevant
dividend literature, especially related to SDDs.  During February 2003, we pre-tested preliminary
versions of our survey among a small group of finance faculty members and MBA students.  Based on
their feedback, we eliminated several questions to shorten the survey and changed the wording on
others to improve clarity.  The final version of the one-page survey consists of 6 questions and 14
statements.  The Appendix contains a copy of the survey.
The survey consists of two sections.  The first section contains six questions (hereafter
referred to by Q#).  The first two questions (Q1 – Q2) concern background information about the
respondents’ involvement in determining their firm’s dividend policy and their current position or title.
The next four questions (Q3 – Q6) ask about the methods firms use to distribute temporary excess
cash to shareholders and their motives for doing so.  Because all of these questions are open-ended
except Q3, they require classifying the responses.
The next section contains 14 statements (hereafter referred to by S#).  In this section, we ask
closed-end questions to lessen the subjectivity involved with classifying responses.  These questions
ask respondents to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with statements about SDDs
derived from empirical evidence.  The respondents use a five-point, equal-interval scale where -2 =
strongly disagree, -1 = disagree, 0 = no opinion, +1 = agree, and +2 = strongly agree.  For these
statements, we use one-sample t-tests to determine whether the level of disagreement or agreement
differs significantly from zero, which represents a “no opinion” response.
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B. Sample
We use data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to identify firms
incorporated in the United States and listed on the NASDAQ, AMEX, and NYSE that paid at least one
SDD during 1994 - 2001.  We limit the period of investigation to improve the chances that survey
respondents are knowledgeable about their firm’s dividend policy.  We consider only securities with
CRSP distribution codes 10 or 11 (ordinary common shares for securities that have not been further
defined).  Thus, we exclude other security types such as American Depository Receipts (ADRs),
closed-end funds, and real estate investment trusts (REITs).  We classify a cash distribution as a SDD
if it carries distribution code 1262 or 1272, the code numbers used by CRSP to identify dividends
labeled year-end, final, extra, or special.  We initially identify 667 SDDs (479 NASDAQ, 97 AMEX, and
91 NYSE).  After adjusting the sample for multiple SDDs by the same company, mergers, and
business failures, the final sample consists of 343 separate companies (250 NASDAQ, 42 AMEX, and
51 NYSE) paying at least one SDD during 1994–2001.  We obtained mailing addresses from
COMPUSTAT and the name of a senior executive for each firm from Hoover’s Online.
We mailed a personalized cover letter requesting participation in this study, along with a
stamped, self-addressed return envelope and the survey instrument, to a top executive of each firm
on March 3, 2003 for NYSE and AMEX firms and on March 5, 2003 for NASDAQ firms.  We received
42 usable responses.  We sent a second mailing to non-respondents on April 9, 2003 to increase the
response rate and thereby reduce potential non-response bias, but received only three usable
responses.  The cover letter requested that if the recipients did not actively participate in determining
their firm’s dividend policy that they should give the survey to someone in their company who was
involved.  The survey contained a code number to identify the respondents and to avoid including
duplicate responses in the analysis. 
Of the 343 surveys, the post office returned 21 as undeliverable.  In addition, 25 firms either
returned the survey blank or contacted us to express their unwillingness to participate.  Our final
sample consists of 45 usable surveys (39 NASDAQ, 4 AMEX, and 2 NYSE), representing 14.0
percent of the 322 delivered surveys.  This response rate is similar to that reported in other recent
13
academic studies in finance involving senior executives.9  The specialized nature of the subject matter
and the increasing demands placed on senior executives may help explain the response rate.
C. Limitations
Our study has several potential limitations.  First, the small number of responses does not
permit partitioning the data by type of listing and hence precludes conducting statistical tests to
determine whether differences exist by this characteristic.  Another limitation is the possibility of non-
response bias.  This is true despite taking the normal precautions to reduce this bias including
guaranteeing confidentiality and using multiple mailings.  To test for non-response bias, we use an
approach similar to that suggested by Moore and Reichert (1983), which compares characteristics of
responding firms to those of non-responding firms.10  If the characteristics of the two groups were
similar, this would lessen the concern about potential non-response bias.  As Table 1 shows,
interpretation of the t-tests for differences in means suggests that the respondents closely correspond
with the non-respondents on the following characteristics: total assets, sales, price to book ratio,
dividend payout and dividend yield.  None of the differences in means was significant at the 5%
level.11
(Insert Table 1 about here)
Accepting that non-response bias may be small, concerns may still exist about the survey
data.  For example, the respondents may not have answered truthfully or carefully.  Given that we
guaranteed confidentiality to respondents, we believe that the former problem is minimal.  Senior
executives are unlikely to complete this survey if their intent is to be untruthful.  Despite our efforts to
                                                
9 For example, Graham and Harvey (2001) achieve a response rate of almost 9 percent from financial
executives in a survey about the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital structure.  Trahan and Gitman
(1995) obtain a 12 percent response rate in a survey mailed to 700 chief financial officers.
10 We could not test for non-response bias by comparing the responses for the firms that returned the survey on
time (first mailing) to those that did not (second mailing) due to the number of usable responses to the first
mailing (n = 42) versus the second mailing (n = 3).
11 Deleting firms whose data were unavailable on Compustat reduced the sample sizes for the t-tests.
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design and pre-test the questions, respondents might not properly understand some questions.  Other
questions might not elicit the appropriate information.
  Finally, our study addresses key issues involving SDDs, but the survey is not exhaustive.
We can do little to change this situation without conducting a follow-up survey, which is impractical at
this time.  We limit the scope and hence the length of our survey to increase the response rate.  The
decision to focus on several important areas involving SDDs entails a tradeoff between
comprehensiveness and the response rate.  As the length and complexity of practitioner surveys
increase, the response rate generally declines, which increases the potential for non-response bias.
In our view, justification exists for the tradeoff in this situation.  Having said this, we believe that these
data are representative and provide additional insights about SDDs.
III. Survey Results
In reporting the survey results, we begin by providing some background data about the
respondents.  We then examine the responses to our three research questions and relate empirical
predictions, where appropriate, to the responses received.  In responding to the survey, some
respondents did not answer each question.
Background Information
To help provide context for interpreting the responses, we sought information about the
respondents’ involvement in formulating their firm’s dividend policy (Q1) and the positions they hold in
their firms (Q2).  Of the 45 respondents, 43 (95.6 percent) said that they are actively involved in
determining their firm’s dividend policy.12  Based on 44 responses, the two most common positions or
titles of respondents are chief financial officer (52.3 percent) followed by president/chairperson (40.9
percent).  The only other positions reported are chief executive officer (4.5 percent) and treasurer (2.3
percent).  Thus, virtually all respondents represent senior executives who are involved in determining
their firm’s dividend policy.
                                                
12 Excluding respondents who are not actively involved in dividend policy decisions has little effect on the
results.
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Although not included in the survey, we also examine the frequency of paying SDDs during
1994 - 2001.  The majority of firms (62.2 percent) paid only a single SDD.  For these firms, SDDs
appear to be a one-time payment rather than a sustained increase in cash payment.  For other firms,
the payment of SDDs occurs more frequently with 24.5 percent issuing two or three SDDs and the
remaining 13.3 percent paying between four and nine SDDs during the sample period.13
Reasons for Paying SDDs
Our first research question concerns why firms choose to pay SDDs.  Although all 45 firms
paid at least one SDD during 1994 - 2001, only 30 respondents gave at least one reason for doing so.
Because respondents could list up to two reasons, the total number of responses is 45.  Table 2
presents the reasons for paying SDDs.  Two reasons constitute almost three-quarters of the
responses.  Firms distribute excess cash as SDDs because (1) they experience strong earnings or
cash flows (40.0 percent) and (2) they want to increase the yield to shareholders (33.3 percent), at
least temporarily.  This finding is consistent with evidence reported by Brickley (1983) and Crutchley
et al. (2003) that firms have unexpectedly high earnings during the year of the SDD announcement.
Ranking a distant third is a lack of investment opportunities (6.7 percent).  Thus, the decision to issue
a special dividend for some firms reduces the potential for managers to squander excess cash on
negative NPV projects.  Overall, the top ranked responses are consistent with our expectations
involving the rationale for using SDDs to distribute temporary excess cash.  
(Insert Table 2 about here)
Reasons for Using Other Distribution Methods
Our second research question focuses on why firms choose to use regular (unlabeled)
dividends or repurchase shares as a means of distributing temporary excess cash instead of paying
SDDs.  Of the 45 respondents, 21 initiated or increased dividends and 32 repurchased shares to
                                                                                                                                                                      
13 We do not partition and analyze the data by frequency of paying SDDs because of the small sample size.
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distribute temporary excess cash to shareholders in lieu of issuing SDDs.  Each respondent could list
up to two reasons for both initiating or increasing regular dividends and repurchasing shares.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the reasons for paying regular dividends with temporary excess
cash.  Although multiple reasons exist, the two top-ranked motives are having strong earnings or cash
flows and serving as a part of standard dividend policy, each with 25.8 percent of the total responses.
Thus, the highest ranked reason for paying both regular dividends and SDDs is the same.  This
finding is not surprising because Crutchley et al. (2003) document that the firms paying regular
dividends and SDDs have unexpectedly high earnings the year of the announcement.  The next
highest ranked motive is the belief that paying regular dividends exerts a positive influence on stock
price.  Overall, the motives for paying regular dividends are consistent with those provided in recent
surveys by Baker and Powell (2000) and Baker, Veit, and Powell (2001).
Panel B of Table 3 contains the responses involving the rationale for repurchasing shares with
temporary excess cash instead of paying SDDs.  The major reasons given by respondents are
consistent with our expectations.  More than a third (34.6 percent) of the respondents reports that the
most important reason to buy back stock with temporary excess cash is to correct perceived
undervaluation.  This finding is not surprising given the substantial evidence on the relationship
between share repurchases and market undervaluation such as Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and
Vermaelen (1995).  This motive supports the market undervaluation version of the signaling
hypothesis.  That is, managers may be signaling their disagreement with how the market is pricing
existing public information.
The second most important reason for repurchasing, with 28.8 percent of the responses, is to
improve accounting measures of firm performance such as earnings per share (EPS).  From a
traditional finance perspective, earnings dilution should not be relevant because only cash flows
should matter.  Yet, managers, stock analysts, and investment bankers often contend that reported
earnings do matter.  For example, Microsoft announced at the urging of analysts that it would resume
buying back its stock to counteract potential dilution of its shares (The Wall Street Journal, August 8,
2000, p. B6).  Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) contend that the “EPS bump” argument has a
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fundamental flaw because it assumes that disposing of idle cash by repurchasing stock also leads to
a rise in a firm’s productivity.  This is not necessarily true because repurchasing shares can affect a
firm’s ability to generate future earnings.
(Insert Table 3 about here)
Views about SDDs
Our final research question concerns how managers view various statements about SDDs
derived from prior empirical research.  Hence, we expect respondents to agree, on average, with S1,
S2A, S2C, S3, S5, S6, S7, S10, and S11, but to disagree, on average, with statements S2B, S2D,
and S4. We have no a priori expectations about their responses to S8 and S9.
Based on our t-tests, half of the 14 statements (S2A, S2D, S3, S5, S7, S8, and S9) differ significantly
from “no opinion” at the 0.10 level or better.  Of these seven responses, all are in the predicted
direction except S5.  The majority of respondents agree with only three statements (S2A, S7, and S9).     
  Of the 14 statements, the most respondents (92.9 percent) agree that firms tend to
repurchase shares, instead of using SDDs, when managers believe their firm’s current stock is under
priced (S7).  In fact, no one disagreed with this statement.  Evidence exists to support the view that
firms are undervalued at the time they announce a repurchase (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Stephens and
Weisback, 1998).  The strong level of support for S7 is also consistent with results shown in Panel B
of Table 3. 
The statement with the second highest level of agreement (72.5 percent) is that the stock
market generally views an announcement of an unexpected SDD as conveying positive information
about a firm’s short-term (current) earnings (S2A).  In an early study, Brickley (1983) concludes that
contrary to a commonly held belief, SDDs appear to convey positive information about future earnings
beyond that related to the current period.  Later research by Gombola and Liu (1999), Lie (2000), and
Crutchley et al. (2003), however, documents that firms pay SDDs when earnings receive a temporary
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positive shock.  Our results support the latter finding, namely, firms announce SDDs after periods of a
short-term increase in operating performance.
The majority of respondents (54.8 percent) agree that firms not paying dividends are more
likely to repurchase shares than to issue SDDs (S9).  Respondents generally disagree (48.8 percent)
that firms paying regular dividends are more likely to issue SDDs than to repurchase shares (S8).
DeAngelo et al. (2000) provide evidence indicating that firms with the highest prior frequency of
special dividends have the lowest subsequent incidence of repurchases.  They also find little evidence
of a connection between the disappearance of specials and the emergence of repurchases as an
important payout vehicle.  These results appear contrary to the views expressed by respondents
involving S8.    We make no predictions about how the respondents are likely to view S8 and S9.  
On average, respondents disagree with the statement that stock price reactions are negatively
related to how frequently a firm declares SDDs (S5).  This finding is surprising and contrary to our
expectation.  Evidence by Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) supports this negative relationship.  They
attribute the negative relationship between excess returns around the announcement of SDDs and the
frequency of announcements to the fact that firms announcing SDDs more frequently declare smaller
ones.  This explanation is consistent with the result reported by Brickley (1983) of the positive
relationship between the size of the SDD and returns.  As Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) note, this
result suggests that investors anticipate the announcements of SDDs by firms frequently declaring
such dividends.  In turn, an implication of this finding is that frequent declarations of SDDs convey
less information than do infrequent declarations.  A study by Mitra (1997) finds that the abnormal
returns are significantly higher for the initial announcement relative to the last announcement.  This
result suggests that the last of a recurring series of SDD announcements conveys less information
than the first, presumably because of greater market anticipation.
Respondents generally do not believe that SDDs cause wealth transfers from bondholders to
stockholders (S2D) as the dividend payment reduces the assets protecting the bonds.  That is,
                                                
14 
19
respondents in our sample do not attribute stockholders’ positive announcement returns to transfer of
wealth from bondholders.  This result is consistent with the findings of Jayaraman and Shastri (1988),
Gombola, and Liu (1999) that the wealth transfer hypothesis cannot explain the positive abnormal
returns associated with SDDs.
Respondents agree that stock prices generally react positively to unexpected announcements
of SDDs of all sizes (S3).  This view is consistent with several studies.  For example, Jayaraman and
Shastri (1988) find that the market considers SDDs as positive signals.  Their evidence also supports
the view that repeated announcements of SDDs, which typically involve smaller declarations, convey
less information than do infrequent SDD announcements, which typically involve larger declarations.
Brickley (1983) also shows that the relative size of the SDD is important in explaining excess returns.
DeAngelo et al. (2000) posit that only SDDs involving large distributions have survived through time
as they, as opposed to small SDDs, are capable of sending positive signals to the market.  Their
results show that over 1962 - 1995 the stock market tends to react favorably to the declaration of a
SDD.  The market reaction, however, is typically modest in size and shows no systematic relationship
to the size or magnitude of the change from one positive special dividend payment to another.  Thus,
our result disagree with the conclusion of DeAngelo et al. that only large SDDs convey good news to
investors.
All the responses for the remaining seven statements (S1, S2B, S2C, S4, S6, S10, and S11)
are in the predicted direction, but are not statistically significant from “no opinion” at normal levels.
Respondents tend to express greater diversity of opinion on these statements than on the previous
seven statements.
DeAngelo et al. (2000) provide evidence that the stock market generally views frequent and
successive SDDs as regular dividends (S1).  They contend that when firms pay SDDs so predictably,
the special versus regular labeling loses much of any meaningful distinction.  Under such conditions,
investors view specials and regulars as reasonably close substitutes.  Our results show that
respondents generally agree with this view, but their reaction is not statistically significant. 
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Respondents appear highly uncertain about whether the stock market generally views an
announcement of an unexpected SDD as conveying positive information about a firm’s long-term
(future) earnings prospects (S2B).  This response differs markedly from the high level of agreement
expressed about SDDs conveying positive information about a firm’s short-term (current) earnings
(S2A).  Gombola and Liu (1999) report, based on revisions of analysts’ forecasts surrounding SDD
announcements, that special dividends may convey information about future earnings.  Based on
additional analysis, they conclude that the signaling effect of SDDs is evident only for current-year
earnings, but not for following-year earnings or five-year earnings growth.  Thus, favorable information
conveyed by SDD announcements reflects transitory, not permanent, earnings.  Evidence by
Crutchley et al. (2003) supports the view that SDDs indicate current excess performance rather than
expected improvement in long-run performance. 
Respondents generally agree that the stock market generally views an announcement of an
unexpected SDD as conveying less positive information about a firm’s future prospects (earnings and
dividends) than does a regular dividend increase of comparable size (S2C), but the average response
does not differ significantly from “no opinion.”  Evidence by Brickley (1983) supports the view that the
market perceives that a regular (unlabeled) dividend increase conveys more positive information than
an SDD of similar magnitude.
Respondents, on average, disagree with the statement that stock prices generally react
positively to unexpected announcements of large SDDs only (S4).  In our discussion of S3, we note
that the stock price reactions to SDD announcements are typically positive and do not consist solely
of large SDDs. 
Respondents express highly divergent views as to whether firms tend to use SDDs, instead of
initiating or increasing regular dividends, when managers believe their firm’s current earnings
performance level does not appear sustainable (S6).  The results show that both 40.5 percent agree
and disagree with the statement, while the remaining 19.0 percent have no opinion.  Empirical
evidence by Gombola and Liu (1999), Lie (2000), and Crutchley et al. (2003) support the notion that
increased earnings related to SDDs are transitory, not permanent.
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The notion that SDDs reduce management’s potential for inappropriately using excess cash
(S10) relates to the free cash flow theory.  By distributing free cash flow to shareholders, instead of
investing in lower return projects, managers should be able to increase shareholder wealth.  In
addition, such distributions should result in lowering managerial perquisites and potentially improve
earnings over the longer term.  Lie (2000) finds that the large incremental disbursements related to
excess funds for larger, but not small, SDDs mitigate the agency problem associated with excess
funds.  Evidence by Howe et al. (1992) and Gombola and Liu (1999) suggests that agency cost
reduction does not appear to be an important motive for paying SDDs.  Thus, the results of the latter
studies do not support the free cash flow theory.
Of the 14 statements, the one with the highest percentage of “no opinion” responses (61.9%)
is whether fewer firms tend to use SDDs as their institutional stock ownership increases (S11).  The
average response is positive, but not statistically significant at normal levels.  DeAngelo et al. (2000)
find a significant negative relation between the level of institutional ownership and the probability that
a firm continues to pay SDDs.  They contend that if institutional investors have a higher degree of
financial sophistication than do retail investors, they should more easily infer the lack of a substantive
difference between regular dividends and specials paid with greater frequency.  Thus, higher levels of
institutional ownership should encourage firms to stop paying SDDs.
(Insert Table 4 about here)
IV. Summary and Conclusions
In this study, we survey top managers of U.S. incorporated firms that announced at least one
SDD during the period 1994-2001 to obtain their views about various reasons and issues involving the
distribution of excess cash.  Based on the survey evidence, our results show that a substantial
proportion of the respondents use multiple methods – regular dividend increases, share repurchases,
and paying special dividends – to distribute excess cash.  Firms tend to pay SDDs when they
experience strong earnings and cash flows and want to increase the yield to shareholders.  Having
strong earnings and cash flows provides an impetus for regular dividend increases, but paying such
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dividends is also part of firm’s standard dividend policy.  The main motives for repurchasing shares
are to take advantage of perceived market undervaluation of the firm’s shares and to improve
performance measures such as EPS.  The latter motive suggests that achieving an “EPS bump” is an
important benefit of stock buybacks.
Taken as a whole, a major implication of this study is that the results lend support to the
signaling explanation for the disbursement of excess funds, but not the free cash flow or wealth
transfer explanations.  Respondents believe that SDDs generally convey positive information about a
firm’s short-term (current) earnings and stock prices generally react positively to unexpected
announcements of SDDs.  The positive market response does not come by transferring wealth from
bondholders to stockholders.  Respondents appear uncertain about whether SDDs provide an
important vehicle for managers to signal stockholders about future firm profitability.  Evidence
suggests, however, that SDD announcements indicate current excess performance rather than
expected improvement in long-run performance.  In addition, an overwhelming percentage of
respondents hold the opinion that firms tend to repurchase shares, instead of using SDDs, when
managers believe that underpricing of their firm’s current stock exists.  This response supports the
undervaluation version of the signaling explanation for stock repurchases.  
Perhaps the most surprising finding is that respondents do not perceive a negative relationship
between the frequency that a firm declares SDDs and the market reaction to these announcements.
Firms declaring SDDs more often typically make small special payments, which results in a modest
stock price reaction.  The market tends to respond more positively to large, non-recurring specials.
Hence, the views of respondents tend to differ markedly from the results of several empirical studies
documenting a negative relationship between the frequency of SDDs and the stock price reaction.
Although various impediments such as the number of respondents precluded extending our
analysis, the results provide additional insights into the rationale for using different methods to
distribute excess cash.  Nonetheless, fertile ground exists for future researchers to study incremental
disbursements of excess funds.  For example, researchers could examine whether the motives for
issuing SDDs and the views managers express about them differ based on the frequency of
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announcement and hence the size of SDDs.  Frequent special dividends tend to be smaller than
infrequent ones.  The motives for small versus large special dividends could differ.  Hence,
researchers should control for the size of the cash disbursement as they further explore the rationale
for paying SDDs.
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Table 1
Firm characteristics:  Responding vs. non-responding firms
This table reports certain firm characteristics (total assets, net sales, price to book ratio, dividend
payout, and dividend yield) for year-end 2002 for both the responding and non-responding firms.  The
first column lists the firm characteristics.  The second and third columns report the value of the firm
characteristic for the responding and non-responding firms, respectively, with the number of firms in
parentheses next to the value.  The fourth column reports the t-value.  
Firm Characteristics Responding Firms Non-Responding Firms t-value
Total assets (in millions) 1,997.4
(n = 19)
2,202.8
(n = 147)
-0.06
Net sales (in millions) 1,377.7
(n = 19)
385.9
(n = 147)
1.95
Price to book ratio 1.56
(n = 19)
3.12
(n = 146)
-0.35
Dividend yield 42.58
(n = 19)
40.37
(n = 146)
0.04
Dividend payout 2.97
(n = 20)
9.46
(n = 151)
-0.39
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Table 2
Reasons for paying SDDs
This table reports the most important reasons firms choose to pay a SDD during the period 1994 -
2001.  Each respondent could list up to two reasons.  Percentages may not add to 100 due to
rounding.
Reason Response
(n = 45)
Rank
Have strong earnings or cash flows       40.0% 1
Increase (temporarily) the yield to shareholders       33.3 2
Lack investment opportunities         6.7 3
Distinguish from an increase in a regular dividend         4.4 4 tied
Meet dividend competition from peers         4.4 4 tied
Serve as part of standard dividend policy         4.4 4 tied
Other (e.g., mergers)         6.7 5
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Table 3
Reasons for initiating or paying dividends and repurchasing shares instead of using SDDs to
disburse excess cash
This table reports the most important reasons firms choose to initiate or pay a regular (unlabeled)
dividend and repurchase shares instead of using a SDD during the period 1994-2001.  Each
respondent could list up to two reasons. No single response in the “other” category constitutes as
much as five percent of the responses.  Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
Reason Response Rank
A.  Initiating or paying dividends (n = 31)
Have strong earnings or cash flows       25.8% 1 tied
Serve as part of standard dividend policy       25.8 1 tied
Exert a positive influence on stock price       12.9 2 
Meet the desires of shareholders         6.5 3 tied
Meet dividend competition with peers         6.5 3 tied
Other (e.g., increase yield to shareholders, signal the strength of the
company)
      19.3
B.  Repurchase shares (n = 52)
Perceive shares as undervalued (bolster the share price and make
stock more attractive to investors)
   34.6% 1
Improve performance measures (e.g. EPS and ROE) 28.8 2
Have strong earnings or cash flows 11.5 3
Provide shares for other uses (e.g., benefit plans, stock splits, and
stock options)
  5.8 4
Other (e.g., provide liquidity to shareholders, signal confidence in the
stock)
19.2
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TABLE 4
Level of agreement/disagreement to statements about disbursements of excess cash
This table shows the level of agreement or disagreement the respondents have with specific
statements about SDDs in general.  Respondents answered each statement based on a five-point
scale where -2 = strongly disagree, -1 = disagree, 0 = no opinion, +1 = agree, and +2 = strongly
agree.  The t-value shows whether the mean responses differ significantly from 0 (no opinion).
Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
S# Statement n Disagree No
Opinion
Agree Mean
(Std.
Dev)
t-value
-2 & -1 0 +1 & +2
1 The stock market generally
views frequent and successive
SDDs as regular dividends
42 30.9% 28.6% 40.5% 0.071
(1.177)
   
  0.393
2A
The stock market generally
views an announcement of an
unexpected SDD as:
A. Conveying positive
information about a firm’s
short-term (current)
earnings.
40
12.5% 15.0% 72.5% 0.775
(0.891)
  5.500***
2B B. Conveying positive
information about a firm’s
long-term (future) earnings
prospects.
40 30.0% 35.0% 35.0% -0.025
(0.947)
  -0.167
2C C. Conveying less positive
information about a firm’s
future prospects (earnings
and dividends) than does a
regular dividend increase of
comparable size.
41 26.8% 29.3% 43.9% 0.244
(1.090)
  1.432
2D D. Causing wealth transfers
from bondholders to
stockholders as the dividend
payment reduces the assets
protecting the bondholders. 
40 35.0% 47.5% 17.5% -0.325
(0.944)
  -2.177**
3 Stock prices generally react
positively to unexpected
announcements of SDDs of all
sizes.
42 21.4% 35.7% 42.9% 0.262
(0.939)
  1.808*
4 Stock prices generally react
positively to unexpected
announcements of large SDDs
only.
42 31.0% 45.2% 23.8% -0.024
(0.841)
 -0.184
5 Stock price reactions are
negatively related to how
frequently a firm declares
SDDs.
42 45.2% 47.6% 7.1% -0.452
(0.739)
 -3.966***
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TABLE 4
Level of agreement/disagreement to statements about disbursements of excess cash --
continued
6 Firms tend to use SDDs,
instead of initiating or
increasing regular dividends,
when managers believe their
firm’s current earnings
performance level does not
appear sustainable.
42 40.5% 19.0% 40.5% 0.000
(1.126)
   0.000
7 Firms tend to repurchase
shares, instead of using SDDs,
when managers believe their
firm’s current stock is under
priced.  
42 0.0% 7.1% 92.9% 1.310
(0.604)
14.042***
8 Firms paying regular dividends
are more likely to issue SDDs
than to repurchase shares. 
41 48.8% 43.9% 7.3% -0.512
(0.779)
 -4.213***
9 Firms not paying dividends are
more likely to repurchase
shares than to issue SDDs.
42 4.8% 40.5% 54.8% 0.667
(0.816)
  5.292***
10 SDDs reduce management’s
potential for inappropriately
using excess cash (e.g., over-
investing). 
40 27.5% 42.5% 30.0% 0.025
(0.947)
  0.167
11 Fewer firms tend to use SDDs
as their institutional stock
ownership increases. 
42 16.7% 61.9% 21.4% 0.024
(0.680)
  0.227
*, **, **** indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Appendix
Specially Designated Dividends Survey
A specially designated dividend (SDD) is a cash dividend labeled by management as “extra”, “special” or “year-end” and
differs from a regular (unlabeled) dividend. 
I.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Directions:  Answer the questions as they apply to you and your firm by placing a check (D) in the box, where appropriate.
  1. Are you actively involved in determining your firm’s dividend policy? Yes  No 
  2. What is your current position or title?    _______________________________________________________________
  3. Has your firm used any of the following methods to distribute temporary excess cash to shareholders during the past
10 years? Check all applicable.
 A.  Pay a specially designated dividend   B.  Initiate or increase regular dividends
 C.  Repurchase shares   D.  Other methods (specify) _________________________
  4. If you checked 3A, why did your firm choose to pay a specially designated dividend? List the two most important
reasons.
A. ____________________________________________________________________________________________
B. ____________________________________________________________________________________________
 
  5. If you checked 3B, why did your firm choose to initiate or increase dividends with temporary excess cash instead of
paying a specially designated dividend? List the two most important reasons. 
A. _____________________________________________________________________________________________
B. _____________________________________________________________________________________________
  6. If you checked 3C, why did your firm choose to repurchase shares with temporary excess cash instead of paying a
specially designated dividend? List the two most important reasons. 
A. _____________________________________________________________________________________________
B. _____________________________________________________________________________________________
II.  OTHER ISSUES ABOUT SPECIALLY DESIGNATED DIVIDENDS (SDDs)
Directions: Circle the number matching your level of agreement with each statement about SDDs in general.
                             Level of Agreement                        
  Strongly No     Strongly       Circle One                
   Disagree Disagree  Opinion   Agree   Agree    Level of Agreement
Statement -2 -1 0 +1 +2      Disagree         Agree
  1. The stock market generally views frequent and successive SDDs as regular dividends. -2    -1     0    +1   +2
2. The stock market generally views an announcement of an unexpected SDD as:
A. Conveying positive information about a firm’s short-term (current) earnings. -2    -1     0    +1   +2
B. Conveying less positive information about a firm’s future prospects (earnings and 
dividends) than does a regular dividend increase of comparable size. -2    -1     0    +1   +2
C. Causing wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders as the dividend payment 
reduces the assets protecting the bondholders. -2    -1     0    +1   +2
  3. Stock prices generally react positively to unexpected announcements of SDDs of all sizes. -2    -1     0    +1   +2
  4. Stock prices generally react positively to unexpected announcements of large SDDs only. -2    -1     0    +1   +2
  5. Stock price reactions are negatively related to how frequently a firm declares SDDs.  -2    -1     0    +1   +2
  6. Firms tend to use SDDs, instead of initiating or increasing regular dividends, when managers
believe their firm’s current earnings performance level does not appear sustainable. -2    -1     0    +1   +2
  7. Firms tend to repurchase shares, instead of using SDDs, when managers believe their firm’s
current stock is under priced. -2    -1     0    +1   +2
  8. Firms paying regular dividends are more likely to issue SDDs than to repurchase shares. -2    -1     0    +1   +2
  9. Firms not paying dividends are more likely to repurchase shares than to issue SDDs. -2    -1     0    +1   +2
10. SDDs reduce management’s potential for inappropriately using excess cash (e.g. over-investing).-2    -1     0    +1   +2
11. Fewer firms tend to use SDDs as their institutional stock ownership increases.  -2    -1     0    +1   +2
To receive a summary of the findings, simply enclose business card or write e-mail address: _________________________
Please check to see that you answered each question.  Thank you for your help.          Company Code  ____________
